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“An Ireland as Complex and Various as Possible”:  
Seán Ó Faoláin’s Writings on Partition in the Context of Peace Process Republicanism 
 
The peace process of the 1990s, and in particular the 1998 Belfast Agreement that implemented 
the current system of devolved government in Northern Ireland, compelled Irish republicans to 
think about partition and unification in new ways. The Agreement states that the north of Ireland 
will remain part of the United Kingdom until a majority of the people from both parts of the 
island of Ireland choose to unify the country. The year 2018, the twenty-year anniversary of the 
ratification of the Belfast Agreement and nearly one hundred years after the establishment of the 
Irish Free State, offers an opportune time to revisit the writings of Seán Ó Faoláin, one of the 
most flamboyant public intellectuals to emerge in Ireland in the post-revolutionary period. Born 
in Cork in 1900 and originally named John Francis Whelan, Ó Faoláin was a prolific author 
whose publications included short stories, novels, life writing, literary criticism, poetry, and 
travel writing. He was also, in his younger years, an anti-colonial insurgent who took part in the 
military campaign against British rule. The son of a constable in the Royal Irish Constabulary 
who was staunchly loyal to the Crown, Ó Faoláin nevertheless fought with the republican side in 
the War of Independence and, following the ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty that cemented 
partition, took the anti-treaty side during the subsequent Civil War. Initially a supporter of 
Eamon de Valera, Ó Faoláin grew increasingly critical of both the man and his politics in the 
aftermath of Fianna Fáil’s success in the 1932 election. This shift in loyalties, combined with Ó 
Faoláin’s public opposition to many of the orthodoxies of Free State Ireland, ensured that he and 
his writings were assigned a key role in the heated scholarly debates that proceeded from the 
reigniting of the Troubles in the late 1960s. In the latter decades of the twentieth century, Ó 
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Faoláin was widely viewed as one of the principle precursors of the anti-nationalist critique that 
has come to be termed “revisionism”. More recently, this understanding of Ó Faoláin, which had 
itself become an orthodoxy, has been called into question. In Empire’s Wake, for example, Mark 
Quigley regards Ó Faoláin as a left-leaning republican whose critique of bourgeois nationalism 
aligns him with the Irish Marxist James Connolly (Quigley 2013: 116). An alternative revising of 
revisionist approaches to Ó Faoláin can be found in Kelly Matthews’s The Bell Magazine and 
the Representation of Irish Identity. Here, Matthews identifies Ó Faoláin as a postcolonial critic 
whose attentiveness to the multi-faceted nature of Irish ethnic and cultural identity anticipates 
Homi Bhabha’s theorization of hybridity in The Location of Culture (Matthew 2012: 25; Bhabha 
1994).  
 
This article, which challenges the earlier identification of Ó Faoláin as a proto-revisionist and the 
more recent attempts to reclaim him for very different left-republican or poststructuralist 
intellectual/political projects, will concentrate primarily on his writings on partition. Though it 
remains one of the least discussed aspects of his work, partition was a recurring preoccupation in 
Ó Faoláin’s non-fiction publications. Ó Faoláin’s thinking on partition will be linked here to 
more frequently-discussed aspects of his work, such as his writings on the ethno-cultural 
complexities of post-revolutionary Ireland and on literary form. Ó Faoláin’s advocacy of an 
inclusive Ireland, it will be argued, represented an extension of his earlier republicanism rather 
than any substantive break with it. With reference to his claim that the military campaigns of the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) were inadvertently shoring up the border, and his promotion of a 
more diverse Ireland that might gradually win the support of northern unionists, the article will 
explore the extent to which Ó Faoláin was a precursor, not, as has been claimed, of revisionism 
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but of a latter-day non-militant pragmatic republicanism that decommissioned its weapons and, 
in the Belfast Agreement, accepted the principle of consent as the basis for a sovereign all-
Ireland state. His writings both point to the range of positions available within post-Civil War 
republicanism and indicate that none of these positions was without its attendant difficulties. 
 
Ó Faoláin’s two biographies of Eamon de Valera, published in 1933 and 1939 respectively, have 
become a focal point for those seeking to chart an ideological shift in Ó Faoláin’s thinking from 
republicanism to revisionism. While his first account of de Valera’s life borders on 
hagiographical, the second expresses a growing disenchantment with this key political figure. 
Roy Foster, in Paddy and Mr Punch, asserts that by the late 1930s, Ó Faoláin had begun to 
distance himself from republicanism (Foster 1991: 111). Given the years specified, Foster would 
appear to view both the latter de Valera biography and the establishment of The Bell magazine, 
which Ó Faoláin co-founded in 1940, as products of Ó Faoláin’s changing political perspective. 
However, in this second biography, Ó Faoláin strongly asserted the continuity of his political 
allegiances, identifying himself as “a republican then and now” and “as a republican anxious for 
a united Ireland” (Ó Faoláin 1939: 102, 158). Moreover, as stated by Paul Delaney, Ó Faoláin 
reinforced his republican credentials in this text through allusions to Ernie O’Malley’s IRA 
memoir On Another Man’s Wound (1936) and Dorothy Macardle’s anti-treaty-inflected 
historical study, The Irish Republic (1937) (Delaney 2014: 120).   
 
Mark Quigley, in Empire’s Wake, claims that Ó Faoláin’s continuing commitment to the 
republican cause from the 1940s onwards was evident in his inaugural Bell editorial, in which the 
rendering of the words ‘north’ and ‘south’ in lowercase registers a disapproval of partition, and 
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also in a number of subsequent editorials in which he explicitly described himself as a republican 
(Quigley 2013: 112, 219). Refuting the ideological trajectory mapped out in Foster’s Paddy and 
Mr Punch, Quigley argues that Ó Faoláin’s changing stance on de Valera was largely motivated 
by what he viewed as the mere lip-service that “the symbolic leader of the republicans defeated 
in the Civil War” was now paying to the notion of a united Ireland (70−71). In support of this 
thesis, Quigley refers to a 1945 review of M. J. MacManus’s laudatory biography of de Valera,1 
in which Ó Faoláin, questioning “whether Mr de Valera realizes how literally vital the question 
of north and south is,” accused the Fianna Fáil leader of childishly talking about Éire while 
“every day and in every way these twenty-six counties become more and more” (Ó Faoláin 
1945: 7, 6). While the sentence ends abruptly without disclosing what exactly the south is 
becoming, Ó Faoláin was clearly alluding to the consolidation of the Free State. In passages such 
as this, he seems to be painfully conscious of the growing entrenchment of a border that was 
becoming increasingly difficult to negotiate the longer it endured and of the inadequacy of 
mainstream nationalist responses to the dilemmas it posed. Thus, he voiced his frustration at de 
Valera’s adoption of a populist rhetoric of reunification when he was in power that ignored the 
hard realities of partition. O’Faolain was not the only figure associated with de Valera at this 
time to express reservations about the latter’s approach to the north/south divide. A 1938 letter of 
resignation, which was never sent, that Seán MacEntee, then Fianna Fáil Minister for Finance, 
wrote to de Valera states that “in regard to partition we have never had a considered policy. It 
has always been an affair of hasty improvisations, a matter of fits and starts” (cited in Ferriter 
2007:151). The common thrust of Ó Faoláin’s criticism of de Valera and that of MacEntee, a 
Belfast-born Catholic who had commanded an IRA unit during the Civil War, reinforces 
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Quigley’s thesis that Ó Faoláin was criticizing de Valera in this and other writings not for his 
republicanism, but for his “inadequate republicanism” (Quigley 2013: 219). 
 
That said, Quigley’s attempt to align Ó Faoláin with the Marxist-republican thinker and activist 
James Connolly is itself open to challenge. Notwithstanding his antagonism to Connolly’s 
positing of Gaelic Ireland as a “prototype, or model, to be reincarnated in a politically free 
Ireland” (Ó Faoláin 1944b: 190), Ó Faoláin clearly held Connolly in high esteem, claiming, in 
“1916−1941: Tradition and Creation,” that “of all those men who died in 1916 most people 
would probably agree that the most human – in the widest and finest sense – was Jim Connolly” 
(Ó Faoláin 1941a: 11). Those wishing to gauge the success of post-revolutionary Ireland, Ó 
Faoláin asserted, should ask themselves the following question: “if Jim Connolly could have 
been vouchsafed a complete picture of this Ireland, would he have been satisfied, a quarter of a 
century ago, that it was worth the game?” (11). Moreover, in line with Marxist thinking, Ó 
Faoláin felt antipathy towards a middle class that had redefined the nationalist project to suit its 
own class interests. In a 1943 editorial, “The Stuffed-Shirts,” for example, he stated that “the 
final stage of the revolution around 1922 became – and is to this day – a middle-class putsch. It 
was not a society that came out of the maelstrom. It was a class” (Ó Faoláin 1943: 187). He was 
particularly hostile to an Irish lower middle class that he equated with “over-dressed women” 
and “cheap mass-produced furniture” (187). Locating its origins in a farming community that 
was economically and culturally impoverished, he proclaimed this class too crude to be 
interesting for literature and, consequently, an impediment to high literary production: “The Life 
now known, or knowable, to any modern Irish writer is the traditional, entirely simple life of the 
farm (simple, intellectually speaking); or the groping, ambiguous, rather artless urban life of 
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these same farmers’ sons and daughters who have, this last twenty-five years, been taking over 
the towns and cities from the Anglo-Irish. They have done it, so to speak, by rule of thumb, 
empirically, with little skill. Their conventions are embryonic; their social patterns are indistinct” 
(Ó Faoláin 1949: 373).   
 
In Ó Faoláin’s analysis, Irish writing had gone into decline with the dissolution of the Protestant 
Ascendancy and the establishment of what he perceived to be a more egalitarian society.2 A 
social levelling of this sort, Ó Faoláin argued elsewhere, “rarely induces a fertile awareness 
either among people or writers” (Ó Faoláin 1962: 103). Ó Faoláin’s critique of the middle class, 
therefore, while overlapping in some respects with the socialist opposition to bourgeois 
nationalism is colored by a cultural elitism and class snobbery not present in the writings of 
leftist critics of the middle class such as Connolly.3 This snobbery was confirmed in Ó Faoláin’s 
latter years when he acknowledged that following the War of Independence he couldn’t help but 
empathize with those who supported the French Revolution but subsequently “found the risen 
people a most scruffy lot, damp, dingy and dirty, horribly vulgar and endowed with . . . 
disgusting habits” (Ó Faoláin 1976: 15).   
 
Moreover, Ó Faoláin’s class-based distain tended to be directed less at those sections of the Irish 
bourgeoisie that had profited most from independence than at the impoverished rural dwellers 
from whom, he claimed, that elite had descended. In “The Irish Conscience?,” he referred to the 
“the peasant” as “stupid and ignorant,” and contended that the “bourgeois of our time” was 
“merely the peasant in a callow, half-baked transitional stage towards demi-semi-civilization” (Ó 
Faoláin 1946: 67). This distain for the rural poor is also evident in his many critiques of the Irish 
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Ireland movement’s preoccupation with eighteenth-century Gaelic Ireland. Proclaiming the 
eighteenth century a time when Ireland was “bereft of its aristocracy in class and brain” (Ó 
Faoláin 1926: 175), he provocatively referred to it as “the fag-end of Irish intellectual activity” 
(Ó Faoláin 1925: 816). Its “native” cultural output, Ó Faoláin claimed, was restricted to the 
writings of mere “semi-popular songsters” and was not worthy of the kind of admiration 
misguidedly bestowed on it by Daniel Corkery in The Hidden Ireland (Ó Faoláin 1938: 23; 
Corkery 1924). Revisionist scholarship likes to assert a clear-cut opposition between a 
cosmopolitan, progressive, and modern Ó Faoláin and a parochial, backward-looking and 
traditional Corkery.4 However, Ó Faoláin did not systematically reject the notion that the “real” 
Ireland was rooted in a Gaelic past. In a 1926 Irish Statesman article, “The Gaeltacht Tradition,” 
for example, he did not dispute the importance of the Gaelic past as such but rather indicated that 
he didn’t consider eighteenth-century Ireland, with its popular poetry and peasant population, an 
adequate basis for a modern intellectual culture.5 Post-revolutionary Ireland, characterized by a 
“rising spirit of brutal egalitarianism” and a corresponding “decline in good manners,” required, 
in Ó Faoláin’s opinion, some higher past to revere as a model than that provided by an 
eighteenth-century Irish society equally lacking in refinement (Ó Faoláin 1942: 384). As Joe 
Cleary points out, “a distinct suspicion of the popular and even of the democratic runs 
throughout Ó Faoláin’s criticism and propels him from the start in the direction of a 
cosmopolitanism that is distinctly elitist in temper” (Cleary 2009: 57). Not surprisingly, this 
aspect of Ó Faoláin’s writings has received scant attention from those who are keen to establish 
him as a poster boy for a post-nationalist liberal Ireland. His cultural snobbery and cosmopolitan 
elitism are also glossed over in the writings of scholars who attempt to cast him in a more 
politically leftist light. 
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While his attempt to link Ó Faoláin with Connolly results in a selective reading of some of the 
former’s writings, Quigley’s claim regarding Ó Faoláin’s continuing commitment to a 
republicanism comprised of a call for a unified sovereign Ireland does stand up to scrutiny. 
However, this commitment was evident not only in the manner in which Ó Faoláin identified 
himself in his Bell editorials but in the forthright, heated, and often bellicose language that he 
employed throughout his life, in a range of publications, when referring to partition. In the 
aforementioned Bell review of MacManus’s Eamon de Valera, Ó Faoláin described partition as 
“the dismemberment of our country” (Ó Faoláin 1945: 18). In an article published in Life 
magazine in 1955, more than fifteen years after Ó Faoláin had, if Foster is to be credited, begun 
distancing himself from republicanism, Ó Faoláin offered the following overly simplistic and 
highly provocative account of the establishment of Northern Ireland: “The British withdrawal 
from Southern Ireland was supposed to have established lasting friendship with the Irish people 
for all time. Unfortunately that ‘final settlement’ was spoiled at the last moment when six of the 
nine counties of the northern province of Ireland (Ulster) were snatched away and put under the 
armed protection of Britain” (Ó Faoláin 1955: 139−41). In Ó Faoláin’s autobiography, first 
published in 1963, blame for the division of the island shifts to the south of Ireland, which, he 
alleged, “sold” Catholics in the north “down the river” (Ó Faoláin 1993: 149). In one of his final 
articles, published when he was eighty-one, Ó Faoláin again attributed responsibility for the 
continuing partition of the country to those living south of the border. In this article, “Living and 
Dying in Ireland,” he claimed that there was some truth to the malicious anecdote that told how 
Eoin MacNeill, a Celtic scholar and the Free State representative on the Boundary Commission, 
had lost the border while trying to find the tomb of Queen Maeve (Ó Faoláin 1981: 5). For Ó 
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Faoláin, the anecdote pointed to an Irish tendency to privilege the past over the more urgent 
exigencies of the moment, such as the partition of the country. In this somewhat eccentric piece 
of writing, Ó Faoláin referred to “the new school of Irish historians” as “cool, judicious and 
discerning” in what appears an approving reference to revisionist historiography, but he went on 
to use distinctly unrevisionist and rather heated language himself when referring to the border as 
a “deplorable boundary” (5). 
 
In a number of his publications, Ó Faoláin established a direct link between his opposition to 
partition and his advocacy of ethno-cultural diversity. In a little-known piece titled “Partition,” 
for example, he addressed northern Protestants in the following complementary and persuasive 
terms: 
 
Because the North has had . . . a closer contact with the world in modern times than 
we have had in the South we look to our union with it for a live synthesis of world-
thought and island-thought. We know our own qualities and are proud of them: but 
we know your qualities and want, as a United Ireland, to be proud of them, too. When 
I think of Partition I think of something that is a sin against Ireland, but I also think of 
something that is a sin against civilization: for the Ireland that could give most to the 
world, add most to the whole edifice of civilization, and get most from it, too, would 
be an Ireland as complex and various as possible (O’Faolain 1944-45: 6).   
 
As mentioned earlier, Matthews draws on Homi Bhabha in her analysis of The Bell’s attempt to 
create “a more complex and inclusive version of Irish identity” that challenged both colonial and 
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nationalist constructions of Irishness (Matthews 2012: 25). However, whereas poststructuralist 
strands of postcolonial studies such as Bhabha’s celebrate diversity as a positive value in itself, 
in Ó Faoláin’s case, as the “Partition” passage cited above indicates, diversity is embraced with a 
very distinct objective in mind: the re-unification of the island of Ireland. Poststructuralist 
versions of postcolonial studies espouse diversity as part of a principled repudiation of 
nationalist commitments to a synthetic or organic culture; Ó Faoláin’s embrace of diversity is, in 
contrast, more strategic and is aimed at the eventual creation of an Ireland “as complex and 
various as possible” that is nevertheless subsumed into and contained by a “United Ireland.” The 
“sin” of partition, Ó Faoláin suggested in “Partition,” can only be remedied by an ethno-cultural 
“synthesis” that is ultimately an act of geographical amalgamation. 
 
Indeed, Ó Faoláin’s writings direct a great deal of ire at any institution or group that impedes 
inclusive versions of Irishness and in so doing either advertently or inadvertently perpetuates the 
border. In the aforementioned “Partition,” which appeared as Ó Faoláin’s contribution to an 
obscure mid-1940s pamphlet titled The North,6 Irish cultural nationalists are dismissively 
referred to as “Little Irelander[s]” (Ó Faoláin 1944-45: 6). This nomenclature points not only to 
their isolationist stance but also to their unintentional reinforcement of the border. The Ireland 
that their focus on things Gaelic and Catholic is helping to maintain is, quite literally, a little 
(twenty-six county) Ireland. In his 1936 review of Cyril Falls’s unionist history, The Birth of 
Ulster, Ó Faoláin was no less damning of northern Protestant exclusivity. Ulster unionism, he 
alleged, both mirrors Irish cultural nationalism and is legitimized by it: 
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If the Irish Free State, which calls itself Ireland, believes strongly in the ennobling 
virtue of nationalism, why should not the Six Counties, which call themselves Ulster, 
also develop a local tradition? Mr Cyril Falls sees no reason why not. But the Gaelic 
tradition before the Plantation he rejects, arguing that it did not create the essential 
character of the Six Counties. If we protest he will reply that we, in the South, reject 
the Anglo-Irish tradition for identical reasons. . . . 
       We may welcome this book. It is the obvious answer to our traditionalists – the 
Contention of the Bards all over again, Belfast versus the Blaskets; and one Hidden 
Ireland seems to be just about as “valid” and as arid as the other. (Ó Faoláin 1936: 
77−78) 
 
The connection that Ó Faoláin formed between his opposition to partition and his embrace of 
diversity does not just appear in his more obscure writings but is also loudly reiterated in some of 
his most widely-discussed articles. Ó Faoláin’s criticisms of the Catholic Church in The Bell are 
often mentioned by those who view him as an early revisionist.7 “The Dáil and the Bishops,” Ó 
Faoláin’s 1951 furious response to the debacle over the “Mother and Child Scheme,”8 is a case 
in point. In this article, Ó Faoláin expressed anger at members of the church hierarchy whose 
behavior with regard to this scheme, he claimed, had exposed the intensely sectarian nature of 
contemporary Ireland: “The Dáil proposes: Maynooth disposes,” he pronounced acidly (Ó 
Faoláin 1951: 7). However, Ó Faoláin’s ire was directed not just at Catholic domination of a self-
declared republican state but also at the way in which such actions served to consolidate partition 
by alienating unionists and confirming their view that “Home Rule is Rome Rule”: 
 
 12 
[T]he recent decision of the Hierarchy has, in practice, had a pulverising political 
effect. I refer of course to Partition. We must presume that their Lordships, being 
farseeing men, weighted it all up, and came to their decision that the unification of 
Ireland must be sacrificed to higher considerations. And this, evidently, is one other 
thing which we much accept henceforth as a fact in Irish life. To adapt Pitt’s famous 
remark, we can now roll up the map of Ireland: it will not be wanted for a hundred 
years. (11−12) 
 
By exposing the extensive influence of the Catholic church on the Irish state, the leaders of that 
church had, in Ó Faoláin’s estimate, ensured that the border would remain in place for the 
foreseeable future. In a similar fashion, in a 1944 editorial “The University Question,” his 
criticism of Archbishop McQuaid’s ban on Catholics within the Dublin diocese entering Trinity 
College culminates in an assessment of how that ban will impact on partition: 
 
We cannot, to give a homely example, tell our children not to mix with our 
neighbors’ children on religious grounds, and at the same time expect our neighbors 
to believe that we have not personal objection to them. Irish Protestants would have 
to be angels, not human beings, not to feel a sub-implication that there is something 
sinister about their creed, and their society. And all this, of course, in its enlarged 
form is of vital importance to us in connection with Partition and the whole political 
future of Ireland (Ó Faoláin 1944a: 7). 
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In the aforementioned Life magazine article of 1955, Ó Faoláin goes even further in his portrayal 
of the Catholic Church as an obstacle to political unification, provocatively claiming that it may 
have a vested interest in the continuing division of the island of Ireland: “As for the Roman 
Catholic Church in the South, it would hardly be expected to survey with pleasure the incursion 
into their southern stronghold of a million sturdy, ingrained Orangemen – Presbyterians, 
Anglicans, Methodists, Baptists and other non-Catholics” (Ó Faoláin 1955: 141).9 As long as the 
Catholic Church remained committed to making the southern state conform to Catholic social 




In this latter article, intriguingly titled “The ‘Doomed Daredevils’ of the IRA warm up their 40 
Years’ War,” the military wing of the republican movement is the main target of censure. Ó 
Faoláin’s critique of the IRA is akin to that advanced in relation to the Catholic Church and Irish 
cultural nationalism in that the organization is ultimately faulted for prolonging partition. 
Though ostensibly seeking to unify the island, the IRA, in Ó Faoláin’s analysis, had actually 
helped to bolster partition by creating a climate of mistrust that precluded open dialogue between 
both parts of the island of Ireland. Anticipating the “border campaign” of 1956-62, Ó Faoláin 
claimed that the recent escalation in IRA activity had ensured that “friendly relations between 
North and South have deteriorated sharply. All hopes of achieving the unification of Ireland by 
conciliation have been put on the shelf. The North says that these men are recruited openly in the 
South, which is true, and that, once they retire southwards across the border after a raid in the 
north, they are immune from arrest, which is also true” (144). While the IRA is not accused in 
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this article, as the Catholic hierarchy and cultural nationalists had been in earlier writings, of 
impeding inclusive versions of Irishness, it is judged to have foolishly privileged a military 
assault on the border and to have devoted far too little attention to creating a genuinely pluralist 
southern republic that might make reunification more attractive to northern unionists. For Ó 
Faoláin, the IRA’s energies had been largely misdirected: “[If the IRA] could attack the problem 
of liberalizing the South with half the courage they are now expending against Britain and the 
North, they would in the long run achieve far more, because then they would be creating in the 
South a life-mode that would attract the North and allay its fears” (150−53). Moreover, given 
their republican genealogy, the IRA, according to O’Faolain, had a special obligation to 
spearhead this necessary transformation of Irish society: “Unless they have completely lost touch 
with the Republican and Fenian tradition to which they belong – it stems ultimately from the life 
and writings of Theobald Wolfe Tone, the father of Irish republicanism, and the principles of the 
French Revolution – their concept of life should be much more liberal, tolerant and humane than 
that which has shaped modern Ireland” (150). 
 
In this 1955 article, as in a number of writings Ó Faoláin published elsewhere, the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland are established as polar opposites: “In a united Ireland the Catholic, 
agricultural South would have to merge with the very different life-mode of the Protestant and 
Presbyterian North, based on other traditions, centered on a mainly industrial economy” (150). A 
statement such as this, which assumes that northern and southern Ireland are separated by 
distinct “life-modes,” might in other hands become a warrant for partition. In the context of Ó 
Faoláin’s celebration of ethno-cultural diversity this statement functions instead as further 
justification for the unification of the island of Ireland. Indeed, in an earlier publication, an 
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editorial published in July 1941 in the first Bell special edition on Ulster, Ó Faoláin suggested 
that, given the disparities between these territories, the south and north of Ireland fundamentally 
needed each other: “Down here, especially since the war, life is so isolated now that it is no 
longer being pollinated by germinating ideas wind-borne from anywhere. . . . Up there, on the 
other hand, a ruthless industrialism, and an equally devastating hyper-internationalism are at the 
same time preventing life from being cultivated with humanity” (Ó Faoláin 1941b: 9). 
 
Ó Faoláin’s conception of diversity in this context has more in common with the writings of 
Matthew Arnold than with those of Homi Bhabha. In this and other discussions of southern and 
northern Ireland, Ó Faoláin suggested that each part of the divided island lacks what the other 
possesses and that each state will be defective therefore so long as it remains apart from the 
other. Bringing these two states together, he implied, would create a complete entity. Obviously, 
this is very far from a poststructuralist embrace of hybridity as a necessary antidote to concepts 
of organic identity and oppressive totalization. On the contrary, Ó Faoláin’s construction of these 
geographical locations as broken jigsaws that lack pieces only the other can supply echoes 
Arnold’s portrayal of the Celt and Anglo-Saxon in “On the Study of Celtic Literature” (Arnold 
1962 [1866]: 291−386). In this work, Arnold famously drew on Ernest Renan’s general thesis in 
“Poésie des Races Celtiques” that “nations were composites of several races in which the 
characteristics of the individual races were mutually complementary” and on the more specific 
claim advanced in Renan’s essay that the role of the Celts in France was to supply the “creative 
aspect of the nation’s national ensemble” (Cairns and Richards 1988: 46). Extrapolating from 
Renan, the spiritual Irish Celts become for Arnold a useful corrective to the Saxon English 
tendency to over-value materialist prosperity, though it is equally assumed that the overly-
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emotional and administratively inept Celts will have to continue to be governed within the 
United Kingdom by the more pragmatic English. Ó Faoláin drew on like rhetorical devices in his 
portrayal of those who lived south and north of the border, but employed them to argue for the 
unification of the island of Ireland as opposed to Arnold’s defense of the unity of the British 
Isles. Even so, in his attempt to construct the north and south of Ireland as polar opposites but 
nevertheless magnetic or mutually complementary parts, Ó Faoláin, like Arnold before him, 
distorted geographical locations and reduced the inhabitants of these locations to often damaging 
stereotypes. Ó Faoláin’s construction of the southern Irish as a corrective to the northern Irish, 
for example, reproduces a colonial ethnic essentialism common to Victorian writings on Ireland. 
Thus, in an article titled “Plea for a New Type of Novel,” he referred to himself as coming “from 
a country mainly Catholic and naturally romantic” (Ó Faoláin 1934: 198). In “Ah Wisha! The 
Irish Novel,” the Irish mind is described as “undisciplined and imaginative” (Ó Faoláin 1941c: 
266). Southern Ireland is invariably portrayed in his writings as romantic but largely ineffectual, 
while Northern Ireland is depicted as competent in material issues but “only an artificial half-
alive thing without the blood of Ireland running through its veins” (Ó Faoláin 1945: 7). 
 
Ó Faoláin’s application of Arnoldian categories to the north and south of Ireland can be 
connected to his theorization of literary form, particularly as found in his writings on realism and 
romanticism. Broadly stated, Ó Faoláin was critical of an Irish version of romanticism – 
grounded in saga, heroic narrative, myth and folklore − that he associated with Revivalist writers 
and the Irish Ireland movement. Post-revolutionary Ireland, he asserted, required a more realist 
aesthetic, one that did not rest on an imaginary Ireland but would represent Irish society, warts 
and all, as it actually was. In the context of a somewhat narrow definition of realism that largely 
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equated it with mimesis, Ó Faoláin was essentially advocating a rejection of “make-believe” in 
favor of verisimilitude.10 Notwithstanding his strong endorsement of realism, Ó Faoláin’s 
writings on this literary form invariably suggest that without assimilating an element of 
romanticism, it would be both incomplete and overly materialistic. Thus, as pointed out by Joe 
Cleary, “the apparently simple dichotomy between ‘romance’ and ‘realism’ is complicated by 
the fact that what Ó Faoláin really aspires to is not so much ‘realism’ in any of the standard 
twentieth-century modes as some sort of higher ‘poetic realism.’ Or, to put it another way, what 
his criticism pursued was not a ‘realism’ that was simply the opposite of ‘romance’ but rather 
one that has somehow merged with and assimilated ‘romance’ into itself” (Cleary 2009: 53). 
Hence, in his “Plea for a New Type of Novel,” Ó Faoláin accused contemporary English realism 
of being excessively literal, while in “Ah, Wisha! The Irish Novel,” he commended the “recipe 
of poetry and realism” employed by Anton Chekhov and John Millington Synge (Ó Faoláin 
1941c: 268). Therefore, Ó Faoláin’s analysis of the relationship between realism and 
romanticism mirrors his analysis of the relationship between the north and south of Ireland in 
that in both cases we are presented with a binary in need of fusion.    
 
In his analysis of Ó Faoláin’s writings on literary form, Cleary makes no reference to the 
former’s stance on partition, but he rightly points out that Ó Faoláin’s desire for reconciliation 
between realism and romanticism was ultimately tied to a desire for the reconciliation of a range 
of other supposed opposites. That binary, for example, could be extended to Protestantism, 
which Ó Faoláin linked to realism, and Catholicism, which he linked to romanticism. As Cleary 
notes, Ó Faoláin persisted in asserting these links even where they appeared to be controverted: 
for example, he consistently associated extreme romanticism, in the Irish context, with the 
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Protestant Yeats and extreme realism with the Catholic Joyce (Cleary 2009: 55).11 Given the 
structural parallels between his treatment of realism/romanticism and his treatment of the 
north/south divide, Ó Faoláin’s call for a realism that had absorbed romanticism was an integral 
part of his advocacy for a united Ireland. In other words, the northern Irish, mainly Protestant 
and hard-headed pragmatists, would merge with the southern Irish, mainly Catholic and given to 
romantic idealism, that merger being to the ultimate betterment of both. 
 
As he outlined in one of his final publications, “A Portrait of the Artist as an Old Man,” Ó 
Faoláin devoted his life to visualizing and attempting to bring into existence new ways of being 
in a post-revolutionary Ireland in which the “old ways of life” associated with British rule had 
been “discredited” (Ó Faoláin 1976: 12). When considering the form that these new ways of 
being should take, he was committed to the creation of an Irish society that Protestants in 
Northern Ireland would find attractive. His advocacy of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity 
certainly overlaps, therefore, with later revisionist calls for a post-nationalist liberal Ireland, but 
whereas many revisionists think partition was historically inevitable and should be accepted by 
all sides as a fait accompli, Ó Faoláin clearly remained an anti-partitionist republican. Hence, Ó 
Faoláin’s writings do not fall neatly into proto-revisionism, but belong rather to a strand of post-
Civil War republicanism that revisionism has mostly airbrushed out of Irish history. As Quigley 
states, Ó Faoláin’s “simultaneous rejection of physical force and the fatally compromized 
republicanism of de Valera underscores the complex and multifarious nature of republican 
thought and politics in this era” (Quigley 2013: 73−74). The notion that Ó Faoláin ceased to be a 
republican in the early 1940s is based, in part, on a narrowly defined understanding of Irish 
republicanism that views it as incompatible with his attempts in The Bell magazine and 
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elsewhere to transform the south of Ireland into a more secular and diverse society. For Ó 
Faoláin, there was no contradiction between a republican opposition to the border and a liberal 
critique of narrow notions of Irishness. Indeed, the transformation of southern Ireland into a 
more pluralist society, in the logic of his approach, was a crucial first step to ending partition.  
 
However enlightened Ó Faoláin’s views might seem compared to those of hardline militant 
republicans who thought that the border could be eliminated by force, his position was clearly 
fraught with its own difficulties. His attempt to placate northern Protestants while also 
constructing them as the polar opposites of southern Catholics resulted in a portrayal of northern 
Protestants as modern, industrial, internationally-inclined and naturally open-minded. In “The 
‘Doomed Daredevils’ of the IRA Warm up their 40 Years’ War,” for example, the “life-mode of 
the Protestant and Presbyterian north” is referred to as “tolerant of all opinions and all religions 
except Irish nationalism and Roman Catholicism” (Ó Faoláin 1955: 150). Clearly, there was 
nearly as much wishful thinking in this conception of things as there was in the idea that the 
border could be overcome by military assault on the northern state. Moreover, in some of his 
writings, Ó Faoláin would appear to seriously underestimate northern Protestant antipathy to 
Irish nationalism and to Catholicism. In the aforementioned article, for example, he asserted that 
“while the north is stamping its feet and shouting, ‘not an inch’, many hard-headed northerners 
secretly want the border to be removed in order to open up a useful market in the south for their 
goods” (141).12 How Ó Faoláin could claim to know what “hard-headed northerners secretly 
want” is hard to fathom. In one of the Ulster editions of The Bell, O’Faolain sought to claim 
those who lived north of the border as co-patriots: “Our fellow-Irishman in the North may not 
have precisely the same picture that we may have in the South about what constitutes ‘a native 
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culture.’ And I sincerely trust that nobody will suggest that because a man is an Ulster 
Presbyterian, let us say, or even a Belfast Orangeman, he is not therefore a ‘fellow-Irishman’ 
with as much right as any Southern Catholic to speak on such matters” (Ó Faoláin 1941b: 11). 
As Matthews observes, some of the northern contributors to this Bell edition, keen to emphasize 
their distinctiveness from their southern neighbors, viewed Ó Faoláin’s seemingly artless 
dismantling of the barriers that separated them with hostility rather than pleasure (Matthews 
2012: 133-34). 
 
Was Ó Faoláin really as naïve about the north and northern unionists as some of these statements 
might suggest? Other writings suggest not. In an editorial published in 1944 as part of a series 
titled “One World,” we get a much more trenchant analysis:  
 
Of these [truths] the first is that even if the problem [of partition] is ever solved on 
paper, by some legal condordat, it will never be solved in the sense of laying 
completely all regional frictions. Secondly, in so far as regional antagonisms ever can 
be laid they can only be brought to rest by a trembling balance of tensions only 
nominally at rest – in that sense talk of ‘ending’ partition is obviously simple-minded. 
Thirdly, no ‘solution’ is likely to be anything but progressive, i.e., spread over 
generations (Ó Faoláin: 1944c: 279). 
 
Moreover, his brief speculations on the political structures that might replace partition indicate 
that Ó Faoláin fully grasped that the north/south divide would not be easily erased. In his 1955 
article on the IRA, he proposed a Swiss-style solution to Irish problems by advocating 
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“federalism, possibly on the lines of Switzerland, where men of different racial origins and 
different religious beliefs live and work contentedly side by side in a politically unified country” 
(Ó Faoláin 1955: 153). Here, he seems to envision a canton system in which Ireland would be 
divided into regionally elected assemblies federated to a national parliament, an idea that would 
emerge again in the late twentieth-century Troubles. In the earlier “One World” editorial, he had 
also looked to the international political arena, writing in glowing terms about a 1940 report on 
Canada that detailed how “the disparate units of North America” – which, “like us . . . had their 
minorities problem, racial and religious” − had come together and “prospered as a federation” (Ó 
Faoláin 1944c: 278).13 Ó Faoláin, while not unaware of the many obstacles to its establishment, 
spent much of his working life trying to pave the way, in Ireland, for just such a polyethnic but 
unified political entity. 
 
Thus far, this article has established Ó Faoláin’s commitment to Irish unity and related this 
commitment to wider strands in his thinking, but questions remain regarding overlaps and 
disparities between Ó Faoláin’s stance on partition and the approaches adopted by others. Clare 
O’Halloran states that attitudes towards the north of Ireland and its inhabitants are often 
contradictory making it difficult to assign consistent positions to institutions or groups 
(O’Halloran 1987: 31). Nonetheless, it is possible to distinguish, in broad sweeps, between 
dominant modes of thinking on partition and the north. Ó Faoláin’s stance was certainly distinct 
from that of the pro-treaty nationalist party Cumann na nGaedheal, later to form Fine Gael, who, 
for the most part, espoused a policy of non-intervention in northern affairs, placing emphasis on 
the remoteness of Northern Ireland from the Free State. As outlined by O’Halloran, “the Cumann 
na nGaedheal line on the north from 1926 onwards” was that “Northern Ireland was a far distant 
 22 
place, hardly connected with the Free State or with Free state concerns” (21). In the first Ulster 
edition of The Bell, Ó Faoláin challenged the notion of the north as a place apart by stressing the 
apparent remoteness of the island as a whole from the rest of the world (Ó Faoláin 1941b: 4), 
while in “Partition,” as mentioned earlier, he argued that the fundamental differences between 
the north and south of Ireland were the basis for a “complex and various” united Ireland that 
would be greater than the sum of its parts (Ó Faoláin 1944/45: 6). Ó Faoláin’s thinking on 
partition also diverged, therefore, from that of some of his fellow anti-partitionists, including 
Eamon de Valera, who suppressed ethno-religious difference by paying homage to the unique 
Irishness of the north.14  
 
In a 1944 editorial, “The Gaelic Cult”, Ó Faoláin critiqued de Valera for increasingly aligning 
himself, during the long period from 1932 to 1948 that Fianna Fáil remained in power, with Irish 
cultural nationalism. In Ó Faoláin’s assessment, Fianna Fáil was sacrificing its republican ideals 
in favor of a more symbolic nationalism. Previously, in a 1932 letter titled “The New Irish 
Revolutionaries,” Ó Faoláin referred to himself as occupying an in-between position, between a 
continuing military response to the treaty and the constitutional policy of de Valera. Michael 
Laffan, in The Resurrection of Ireland, states that while “de Valera might appear intransigent to 
supporters of the treaty, . . . to sea-green incorruptible republicans his views were suspiciously 
moderate” (Laffan 1999: 424). Ó Faoláin, as indicated in this 1932 letter and elsewhere, shared 
this republican assessment of de Valera, but his repudiation of military solutions to partition 
distinguished him from those who were voicing this assessment most vehemently. A rejection of 
the armed struggle was not the only distinction between Ó Faoláin and his non-constitutional 
republican contemporaries. Eoin Ó Broin states that the republicans who were critical of de 
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Valera, including those on the left, often adopted a rhetoric that “placed great store in the 
egalitarian and anti-sectarian discourse of the United Irish movement and the 1916 
proclamation” (Ó Broin 2009: 171). Nonetheless, for the most part they replicated “the 
exclusions and marginalizations” of unionists “prevalent in mainstream conservative nationalism 
and Irish society more generally.” Ó Faoláin, by contrast, Ó Broin asserts, contributed to “a 
valuable reservoir of thinking and activism” on the issue of unionism (172).  
 
The combination of a rejection of a populist nationalism that was failing to prioritize the issue of 
partition, a renouncement of the armed struggle and a focus on ethnic inclusivity aligns Ó 
Faoláin with a latter-day Belfast Agreement republicanism.15 That said, Sinn Féin, the main 
republican participants in the Agreement, has always viewed partition in broader terms than Ó 
Faoláin. Contemporary Sinn Féin has concerned itself not only with the issue of Irish unity but 
with challenging the sectarianism of the northern state established after partition, and with 
attempting to minimize the repercussions of that state on the lives of the Catholic minority living 
north of the border. Ó Faoláin’s commitment to a republicanism comprised solely of a call for a 
unified sovereign Ireland ensured that he paid little attention to that minority. In the Ulster 
editions of The Bell, for example, “our fellow-Irishman in the north” is referred to as an “Ulster 
Presbyterian . . . or even a Belfast Orangeman” (Ó Faoláin 1941b: 11). Prioritizing the issue of 
political unity over all else led him to reach out to unionists at the expense of addressing the 
plight of northern Catholics excluded from political and economic power and from social and 
cultural equality. Consequently, he could condemn continuing republican militarism without ever 
taking account of the socio-economic conditions that sustained it.  
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How might we view Ó Faoláin’s stance on partition in light of the contemporary post-Belfast 
Agreement situation? Notwithstanding considerable setbacks, Northern Ireland in the aftermath 
of the Belfast Agreement is internationally perceived to be a success story in the annals of ethno-
national conflict-regulation. Former U.S. president Bill Clinton regularly invokes the Agreement 
as a model for the resolution of other conflicts and regards it as one of the principal foreign 
policy achievements of his career. Nevertheless, post-Agreement voting patterns suggest that the 
end of military conflict has not changed deeper nationalist and unionist belief-systems or 
commitments.16 Northern republicans remain committed to the aim of a united Ireland, and 
unionists still want Northern Ireland to be an integral part of the United Kingdom with a secure 
state border separating it from the Republic of Ireland.  While some anti-Agreement republicans 
believe that the Belfast Agreement underwrites partition, others, including key figures within 
Sinn Féin, view it as a vehicle to bring about Irish unity by degrees. Thus, in a 1999 address to 
the assembly, Sinn Féin president Gerry Adams, pointing out that his party’s “goal remains the 
establishment of a united free and independent Ireland,” asserted that “the Good Friday 
Agreement is the transitional structure that will allow us to achieve that legitimate objective” 
(cited in Wolff 2001: 20). As Brendan O’Leary states, republicans in Sinn Féin and the IRA who 
have ‘trad[ed] a long war that they could not win or lose for a long march through institutions” 
can “reasonably claim that only their means have changed, not their end, the termination of 
partition” (O’Leary 1998: 1655). Abandoning the long-standing republican argument that the 
people of the island of Ireland are the appropriate decision-making unit for determining the 
future of the country, both north and south, Sinn Féin, in signing up to an Agreement that 
recognizes Northern Ireland’s right to self-determination, has formally accepted that the consent 
of the Protestant, at present predominantly unionist, sector of the population north of the border 
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is a necessary pre-condition of Irish unity. Likewise, while the emphasis has changed from 
assimilation into a single nation to a celebration of heterogeneity, the Irish Government and its 
people did not reject the concept of Irish unification when they endorsed the Agreement.17 The 
amended Irish Constitution states that it is ‘the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and 
friendship, to unite all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the 
diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that a united Ireland shall be brought about 
only by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people expressed, in both 
jurisdictions in the island’ (Article 3, Bunreacht na hÉireann). The gradualist approach towards 
unity adopted by Sinn Féin and the Irish people would seem to be largely in keeping with the 
pragmatic gradualism earlier endorsed in Ó Faoláin’s work. Moreover, the kind of united Ireland 
envisaged by those who view the Belfast Agreement as a tentative first step to ending partition 
overlaps considerably with the inclusive Ireland that Ó Faoláin sought to lay the foundations for 
in his writings. 
 
How tenable is this approach to ending partition? The notion that the creation of a more 
prosperous, liberal and inclusive southern society will be sufficient to win over northern 
unionists is arguably as fragile today as it was when Ó Faoláin edited two Bell special issues on 
Ulster in the early 1940s. Recent events supply plenty of evidence for this. In the BBC Northern 
Ireland leaders’ debate for election 2015, Nigel Dobbs from the Democratic Unionist Party 
accused Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness of first trying to bomb him into accepting a united 
Ireland and then trying to cajole him into one.18 The second strategy, Dobbs asserted, had no 
greater possibility of success than the first. That said, while some opponents of Irish unity have 
viewed the Belfast Agreement as protecting the union,19 others, as indicated by the following 
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statement by Dobbs, have largely agreed with Sinn Féin’s assessment of it: lamenting that 
everything seems to be pointing to a slide towards Irish unity, Dobbs has remarked plaintively 
that ‘the Northern Ireland recognized in this document is a different one from the Northern 
Ireland that I knew prior to this Agreement. This is a Northern Ireland in transition to a united 
Ireland’ (cited in Aughey 2001: 195). This evaluation of the agreement has understandably led to 
reluctance on the part of some unionists to engage with the cross-border bodies established by 
Strand Two of the Agreement on the basis that the all-Ireland institutions involved will become 
the foundations for an all-island political entity, possibly the kind of federal state envisaged by Ó 
Faoláin.20 On December 31, 1999, the Irish Independent published an opinion poll that found 86 
percent of those living south of the border in support of a united Ireland, with nearly half 
expecting it within 10 years, a further 21 percent within 20 years. However, in 2018, twenty 
years after the Agreement was signed, Ó Faoláin’s speculation that “no ‘solution’ [to partition] is 
likely to be anything but progressive, i.e., spread over generations” seems apt (Ó Faoláin: 1944c: 
279). It remains to be seen whether the current political dispensation in Northern Ireland is, as 
some republicans maintain, an extended transitional phase with the potential to “solve” partition 
at some point in the future or, as pro-Agreement unionists hope, a new status quo that safe-
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I am grateful to Joe Cleary for his careful reading and editing of an earlier draft of this article. 
1 For the biography that Quigley refers to, see MacManus. 1944. 
2  Joe Cleary has quite rightly stated that Ó Faoláin’s assertion that the Irish revolution created a 
“one-class society . . . ignores the real social inequality and class stratification, not to mention 
gender oppression, that have remained consistent and conspicuous features of modern Irish 
society at every stage of its development” (Cleary 2009: 71). 
3  Similarly, while Ó Faoláin shared with leftist commentators a concern with naturalism, his 
response to it was shaped by a very different value-system. Though typically offering a strong 
critique of society, naturalism, as Ó Faoláin pointed out, tends to deny the significance of human 
action. Thus, Ó Faoláin argued, it is diametrically opposed to religion which affirms the 
importance of mankind. Ó Faoláin’s critique of naturalism from the perspective of a self-
professed Catholic can, therefore, be contrasted to a leftist appraisal of this literary form that is 
also concerned with its denial of human agency but focuses on naturalism’s tendency to stress 
the ways in which all human actions are overdetermined by greater forces.  
4  For an overview of Corkery’s writings that challenges the role they have been assigned in 
revisionist scholarship, see Laird 2012.  
5  In this article, he claims that the poetry of eighteenth-century Ireland has “none of the 
characteristics of the real Ireland, except very rarely in O’Rahilly, much more rarely in Eoghan 
Ruadh, and vanishing after his death.” He then contrasts these writings to “The Lament of the 
Old Woman of Beara”, generally believed to be written in the ninth or tenth century, referring to 
this earlier poem as “the literature of the real Ireland” (Ó Faoláin 1926: 175). 
6  The North was published by a group of anti-partitionist northern Protestants called The Ulster 
Union Club. The club’s president was the Irish politician, author and journalist Denis Ireland. On 
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the pamphlet’s back cover page, it is stated that the club “provide[s] a meeting place for those 
Ulster Protestants who recognise that the unity of their country is essential for its cultural, social, 
and economic progress.” The pamphlet was published shortly after the appointment of the 
staunchly unionist Basil Brooke as Prime Minister of Northern Ireland.   
7  While much emphasis has been placed in revisionist scholarship on Ó Faoláin’s quarrel with 
the Catholic church, very little attention has been paid to his commitment to it. This commitment 
is most evident in his extraordinary biography of Cardinal John Henry Newman, Newman’s Way. 
It is also indicated in his critique, in The Vanishing Hero, of the depiction of Catholicism in 
Brideshead Revisited; in his aforementioned denouncement, in “The Modern Novel: A Catholic 
Point of View,” of naturalism from the standpoint of a self-declared Catholic; and in his lament, 
in “Love Among the Irish,” that many of those who leave Ireland to escape a repressive society 
abandon their faith. It should be noted that some of Ó Faoláin’s most bitter disputes with the 
Catholic church in The Bell took place while he was preparing Newman’s Way for publication.          
8  The so-called “Mother and Child Scheme” was a health care program proposed by Dr Noel 
Browne, the minister for health in Ireland’s first inter-party government, to provide maternity 
care for all mothers and healthcare for children up to the age of sixteen. It was condemned by 
conservative elements within the Catholic Church as a state encroachment on the sanctity of the 
family. In addition, some clergy feared that the scheme, which involved a limited degree of sex 
education, would pave the way for birth control and abortion. The church’s opposition, combined 
with that of an Irish medical establishment hostile to the development of a public health system, 
ensured that the scheme was abandoned.  
9   As Mary Harris indicates in The Catholic Church and the Foundation of the Northern Irish 
State, the Catholic Church hierarchy in the aftermath of the establishment of Northern Ireland 
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was, in fact, predominantly opposed to partition, publicly warning of the “religious and political 
dangers for Catholics” living north of the border (Harris 1993: 257). This concern for the 
spiritual and physical well-being of northern Catholics would appear to have outweighed any 
anxiety that church leaders may have had about the greater religious diversity that would result 
from a united Ireland. 
10  For a detailed analysis of the limitations of Ó Faoláin’s conceptualization of realism, see 
Cleary 2009. 
11  In The Irish, Ó Faoláin referred to Yeats and Joyce as “the bell-wether of all our romantics 
and our one great realist” (Ó Faoláin 1969: 131). 
12  For an analysis of the stereotype of the “hard-headed unionist,” see O’Halloran 1987 (41−50). 
O’Halloran claims that this stereotype was often employed to reinforce the argument that 
unionists could be tempted by economic gain into accepting a united Ireland. 
13  Ó Faoláin was referring here to the Rowell-Sirois Report, published in three volumes as the 
Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations.  
14  For an anlaysis of the concept of the north as especially Irish, see O’Halloran 1987 (18−24).  
15  However, it should be noted that while Sinn Féin has officially declared for the kind of liberal 
and pluralist civic society that Ó Faoláin espoused, some of its membership endorse a Gaelic 
Ireland rhetoric that Ó Faoláin might well have disputed as similar to that used by de Valera in 
the 1930s and 1940s.  
16  For an overview and assessment of post-Agreement voting patterns, including a detailed 
analysis of the shifts in unionist and nationalist support to the political parties perceived to be the 
stronger defenders of their ethnic interests, see Tonge 2006.  
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17  As stated by John Coakley, “a referendum [held in the Republic of Ireland] on the Belfast 
Agreement on May 22, 1998 saw a vote of 94 percent in favor of a set of constitutional changes 
designed to permit its implementation. A poll in mid-December 1999 showed that 96 percent of 
those expressing a view on the matter would like a united Ireland – though subject to a rather 
indefinite time limit: ‘at some stage in the future’” (Coakley 2001: 223).  
18  This leaders’ debate, which was hosted by BBC presenter Noel Thompson, was first shown on 
May 5, 2015, at 8pm.   
19  In Brendan O’Leary’s assessment, the unionists who supported the Belfast Agreement were 
trying to ensure that no British government could make further deals over their heads with the 
Irish state (O’Leary 1998: 1656). However, the union that they were seeking to protect has, 
O’Leary claims, been fundamentally transformed in that “the Agreement is . . . based on Irish 
national self-determination as well as British constitutional convention” (1646). 
20  These bodies are concerned with cross-border, whole island co-operation in such areas as 
trade and business development, food safety, minority languages, waterways and tourism. When 
addressing the 2002 annual conference of the Democratic Unionist Party’s youth-wing, Peter 
Robinson, the party’s deputy leader at that point in time, claimed that institutionalized north-
south co-operation posed the “greatest long-term threat” to the union (cited in McCall 2006: 
309).    
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